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Abstract 
This Report offers recommendations for the amendment of the Council Decision 2010/427/EU 
establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service.  Its purpose is 
to contribute, in practical legal terms, to the ongoing review of the Decision in 2013, as well as to the 
possible discussion on its revision that may take place in 2014. In particular, it sheds light on possible 
adjustments in the application of the Decision ‘à droit constant’, but also suggests potential alteration 
of its formulation. 
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Preface 
 
The present document offers recommendations for the amendment of Council Decision 2010/427/EU 
establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (hereinafter 
‘EEAS Decision’). These recommendations have been distilled from discussions between academics 
and practitioners during a two-day workshop at the European University Institute (EUI) in March 
2013, in the framework of the so-called EEAS 2.0 project. They follow the publication, by EEAS 2.0, 
of a legal commentary on the EEAS Decision,1 and should be read with this commentary in mind. 
EEAS 2.0 is a collaborative research initiative involving independent scholars brought together by the 
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), the EUI and the Centre for European Policy 
Studies (CEPS). It is carried out in association with the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and 
Governance (ACELG), the Centre for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER), the European 
Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, and the 
University of Copenhagen.  
In formulating the recommendations we took account of policy papers, non-papers and proposals that 
have been initiated by EU institutions, member states, think tanks and academia, notably in the context 
of the ongoing review. Naturally, they also pay attention to the EEAS Review prepared by High 
Representative Ashton and published last summer.2 Yet, it was not the intention of the authors of the 
present document legally to translate all the proposals contained in that Review. For the latter goes 
beyond the implementation of the EEAS Decision stricto sensu, and its possible revision as envisaged 
in Article 13(3) EEAS Decision, which, by contrast, has served as the specific framework for the 
drafting of the enclosed recommendations.  
Indeed, the purpose of the present document is to contribute, in practical legal terms, to the ongoing 
review process, as well as to the discussion on the revision of the EEAS Decision that may or may not 
occur following the General Affairs Council conclusions of December 2013. In particular, it sheds 
light on possible adjustments in the application of the Decision ‘à droit constant’, but also includes 
suggestions that may be considered in the context of an amendment of the Decision. With regard to the 
latter, several levels of revision may be envisaged: i) a mere toilettage (e.g. deleting out-dated 
provisions and securing terminological consistency), ii) technical changes in the text without 
reopening the political discussion that predated the adoption of the Decision and iii) a more ambitious 
revision that could require more extensive legal modifications of collateral secondary measures (e.g. 
Staff and/or Financial regulations), if not of the founding treaties.  
Steven Blockmans and Christophe Hillion 
Coordinators, EEAS 2.0 
                                                     
1 The commentary is available at e.g.: www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2013_1.pdf; www.ceps.eu/book/eeas-20 
legal-commentary-council-decision-2010427eu-establishing-organisation-and-functioning-e; 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28338/AEL_2013_03.pdf?sequence=1. 
2 High Representative, EEAS Review (2013): http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/29072013_eeas 
_review_en.htm. 
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Article 1 – Nature and Scope 
 
• Para 1 mirrors the terminology of Article 27(3) TEU, and does not raise any particular issue. 
• Para 2: The definition of the EEAS as a “functionally autonomous body of the European Union, 
separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission” is ambiguous. 
Indeed, while stressing the idea of distinctiveness, the unhappy combination of the notions of 
functional autonomy and separateness does not seem to represent accurately the position of the 
Service in relation to EU institutions, as articulated in other parts of the Decision. A tension is 
thus detectable between the above notions on the one hand, and the different functions of the 
Service as per e.g. Article 2 EEAS Decision, on the other. For instance, the latter refers to the 
EEAS as “assisting (inter  alia) the Commission” which is the terminology used to describe the 
role of Directorates-General within the Commission, thereby suggesting that the Service might 
sometimes operate as Commission DG, viz. when serving the HR/VP as VP.3 That the Service 
should “assist” the Commission (President), and the President of the European Council also 
conveys an impression of hierarchy, which runs counter to the notion of functional autonomy. A 
similar ambiguity concerns the EEAS supporting the HR/VP in his Council functions (i.e. HR 
qua chair of the FAC, and chairing related working groups), which could be read as the EEAS 
operating as an extension of the General Secretariat of the Council.  
• Should the EEAS Decision be revised, simplification in the formulation of the Service’s status 
would be welcome. In this respect, as para 3 establishes that the EEAS is placed under the 
authority of the HR/VP, there may be a question as to whether the express references to the 
“autonomous” and “separate” character of the EEAS vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat General are necessary. Thus, would a simple formula whereby the EEAS supports 
the HR qua VP and HR be sufficient to establish its autonomy? Can it be assumed that this 
autonomy naturally flows from the autonomy of the HR? Or would the absence of any reference 
to the EEAS’ autonomy (or separateness) reinforce the perception that the Service sometimes 
operates as an extension of the Commission, sometimes as a service of the GSC? Indeed, is the 
HR/VP legally autonomous enough? A solution might be to include para 3 in a shorter version 
of para 2 in the following way: “The EEAS, which has its headquarters in Brussels, shall be an 
autonomous body of the European Union, placed under the authority of the High 
Representative…”. Para 3 would then be devoted to the legal capacity of the Service. 
• But the “legal capacity” with which the EEAS is endowed by Article 1(2) is equally a source of 
ambiguity in the definition of the Service’s status. Established for practical purposes (i.e. “legal 
capacity necessary to perform its tasks”), such legal capacity is also conceived as a tool to 
permit the EEAS to “attain its objectives”. Yet, such objectives are not mentioned, let alone 
articulated, elsewhere in the Decision, nor are they evoked in EU primary law. Instead, the 
Service is formally endowed with “tasks” (Art 2 EEAS Decision), thus creating uncertainty 
about the contours of the legal capacity. 
• Indeed, while such capacity appears to include the Service’s ability to appear in Court, as 
illustrated by several Staff cases, the question can be raised as to whether it can also entail 
EEAS intervention in Court’s proceedings, and indeed locus standi, e.g. to challenge actions or 
inactions of EU institutions that would prevent the EEAS from fulfilling its tasks. To be sure, 
the Decision makes no mention of the question of legal representation of the EEAS, notably for 
dealing with local authorities: Should it be the Executive Secretary General, or the Chief 
Operating Officer, or perhaps both?  
                                                     
3 That the Cabinet of the HR/VP is part of the Commission staff while Heads of EU Delegations, though 
formally part of the EEAS staff, occasionally act qua Commission (as made clear in the ELTI order of the 
General Court), adds to this tension. 
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• Technical revision of EEAS Decision could thus include a formulation of the Service’s legal 
capacity. In particular, it should either refrain from referring to the phrase “attain its objectives” 
if those are not defined elsewhere, or articulate these in the Decision. Revision could also bring 
clarification as regards the legal representation of the EEAS. 
• Para 4 does not create any particular difficulty.  
 
Steven Blockmans and Christophe Hillion 
6 
Article 2 – Tasks  
 
• Para 1 reflects Articles 18 and 27 TEU to which it explicitly refers. This connection in itself 
does not raise particular issues. The second part of para 1 that elaborates the three-fold tasks of 
the EEAS, by reference to those of the HR/VP, is by contrast fraught with ambiguity, and would 
benefit from reformulation. The same holds true of the second paragraph, particularly when read 
in connection with other provisions of the Decision. 
• There are two aspects to the EEAS tasks as set out in Article 2: one is positive, namely to 
“support” and “assist”, and the other is negative: its tasks are defined by default, namely 
“without prejudice to normal tasks” of institutions. Yet, the notion of “normal” to delimit the 
tasks of the EEAS is unhelpful as the “normal tasks” of both General Secretariat of the Council 
and Commission have been profoundly affected by the very existence of the EEAS, leading to a 
‘new normal’ that still has to be found.  
• Moreover, a question arises as to whether the notion of “assist” (para 2) entails a lighter task 
than “support” (para 1), which perhaps implies policy-making. Indeed, the provision does not 
make clear what the policy-generating task of the EEAS is, and how far it can go. Thus, can the 
EEAS engage in self-definition of its tasks, particularly in view of the reference to “the legal 
capacity necessary… to attain its objectives” in Article 1(2) EEAS?  
• The question thus arises as to whether Article 2 could benefit from spelling out the different 
external policy areas in which the EEAS is tasked to work. At the same time, the absence of 
specific substantive indications in the list of EEAS tasks may reflect its essentially coherence 
building mandate, rather than a Service endowed with specific substantive competence. Thus, 
the reformulation of Article 2 ought perhaps to focus on reinforcing its coherence task, in line 
with the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty (notably Art 21(3) TEU) and of the Council Decision writ 
large. In this respect, we might wonder whether the formulation of para 1 regarding the EEAS 
support function in relation to the HR/VP qua VP should be revised with a view to 
strengthening the latter’s coordinating function within the Commission, albeit without 
infringing the provision of Article 40 (1) TEU.  
• Given the breadth of the HR/VP mandate, and in turn of the EEAS as per Article 2, should 
deputisation of HR/VP be evoked in Article 2(1)? The purpose of such a mention would be, at 
the very least, to make clear that the EEAS supports not only the HR/VP in all his functions, but 
also his deputy/ies. Arguably, such an inclusion would depend on the conception of such 
deputisation: should it be complete, in the sense of allowing the deputy fully to represent the 
HR/VP in all his/her functions, preliminary amendment to the founding Treaties would possibly 
be required, given the triple-hatted deputisation that it would entail for concerned 
Commissioners. Thus the Decision’s reference to deputies would only be conceivable once 
primary law has been adjusted. Partial deputisation, by contrast, in the sense of establishing 
sectorial deputies (e.g. one for the HR/VP qua VP; one for the HR/VP qua Chair of the FAC, or 
of Defence), could be easier to establish under the current Treaties. The Decision could thus 
refer to such deputies without requiring a preliminary Treaty change. That said, such a partial or 
functional deputisation might negate the purpose of the Lisbon Treaty which coalesced those 
functions to achieve coherence, and make the latter more difficult to achieve.  
• As evoked above, para 2 conveys an impression of hierarchy between the Commission 
(President) and the President of the European Council on the one hand, and the Service on the 
other, which is at odds with the provisions of Article 1 EEAS Decision. One option to diffuse 
the tension would be to integrate this paragraph, with amended wording, in Article 3 EEAS 
Decision, which concerns cooperation, notably between the Service and EU institutions.  
EEAS 2.0 
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Article 3 – Cooperation  
 
• The multi-layered duty of cooperation foreseen in Article 3 EEAS Decision is a specific 
application of the TEU-based principle of sincere cooperation binding member states (Art 4(3) 
TEU) and institutions (Art 13(2) TEU). Indeed, Article 3 envisages it as various obligations of 
conduct (obligation to “support”, “work with”, “consult”, “take part in preparatory work”), 
which echo the duties that the Court of Justice has articulated in its case law on the principle of 
loyal cooperation. Hence, paragraph 1 introduces an obligation of cooperation as a general duty 
of the EEAS to “support and work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member 
States, as well as with the General Secretariat of the Council and the services of the 
Commission”, and “other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular the European 
Parliament” (para 4).4  
• However, the obligations spelled out in Article 3 EEAS Decision appear to vary depending on 
the subject matter and/or the actor concerned. The ensuing complexity in its formulation 
conveys the impression of a more differentiated implementation of the duty of cooperation than 
under EU primary law; a paradox in view of the importance of its comprehensive application for 
the Service to achieve its coherence mandate. Thus, the duty to consult foreseen in para 2 is 
explicitly addressed to the EEAS and the Commission, without mentioning the Council 
services, or member states’ diplomatic services. While textually this could entail that only the 
Commission is subject to an obligation of consultation with the EEAS, arguably this would sit 
uncomfortably with the general duty of sincere cooperation that binds all institutions under 
Article 13(2) TEU. 
• In the same vein para 2 shields the CSDP from the operation of the duty of consultation. This 
CSDP exceptionalism is, however, problematic in terms of permitting the EEAS effectively to 
support the HR/VP in achieving coherence, given the considerable significance of other external 
policies of the EU to achieve CSDP objectives. The ability of the HR, and incidentally of the 
EEAS, to fulfil their coherence-making task primarily depends on the cooperation of both the 
Commission and Council, in line with the requirement of Article 21(3) TEU.  
• The same holds true for the member states. In para 1, the obligation of cooperation appears to 
operate only one way between the EEAS and the member states’ diplomatic services, in contrast 
to earlier drafts of the Decision. Similarly, Article 5(9) EEAS Decision no longer expressly 
foresees that the Union Delegation and diplomatic services of the member states exchange 
information, on a reciprocal basis.5 Only Article 10(3) EEAS Decision expressly requires 
assistance from member states, in the specific field of security.6 That said, the provisions of 
Article 4(3) TEU on sincere cooperation entail that the member states are bound to cooperate 
with EU institutions to achieve the Union’s coherence objective as per Article 21(3) TEU, and 
thus to facilitate the fulfilment of the EEAS tasks, including by cooperation with the Service 
itself. At the very least, the cooperation from member states is required in organisational terms 
                                                     
4 Indeed, the EEAS duty of cooperation is not limited to those actors mentioned in the first paragraphs. Article 2(2) 
envisages that the EEAS assists the presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission, 
respectively. As argued above, this provision could be included in Article 3. 
5 Ashton’s proposal of March 2010 reads as follows: “The Union delegations shall work in close cooperation 
with the diplomatic services of the Member States. They shall, on a reciprocal basis, provide all relevant 
information” (emphasis added).  
6 See Article 10 EEAS Decision, below.  
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to fulfil the requirements of Article 27(3) TEU, and ensure the smooth functioning of the EEAS, 
given the national element of its composition.7  
• Para 2 foresees that “this paragraph shall be implemented in accordance with Chapter 1 of Title 
V of the TEU, and with Article 205 TFEU”. The cooperation between the EEAS and the 
Commission, both in the form of consultation and preparatory collaboration is thus determined 
by a specific normative framework. Yet, given that this Chapter 1 sets out the “general 
provisions of the Union’s external action”, it is surprising that the reference to this normative 
framework should only be made in the specific context of para 2, as if the objectives and tasks it 
encapsulates were to be achieved only through the cooperation between the EEAS and the 
Commission, and not also with the member states and the General Secretariat of the Council. 
All the activities of the EEAS and of other institutions too, and all their interactions within the 
EU system of external relations are legally determined by the “general provisions of the Union’s 
external action” set out in that Chapter 1. We therefore suggest the deletion of this particular 
reference to Chapter A of Title V, and to Article 205 TFEU, which should be included in the 
preamble of the Decision. 
• Para 4 refers to Regulation 1073/19998 about OLAF’s investigation powers, and includes the 
request that the EEAS adopt a decision on the terms and conditions for internal investigations. 
The question arises as to whether this request should be deleted given that ”the” decision has 
been adopted, or whether that power should remain for the purpose of amending that decision, if 
need be.  
• In view of the potential for broad application of the obligation of cooperation encapsulated in 
Article 3 EEAS Decision, as suggested above, and the general principle of sincere cooperation 
from which it ultimately derives, a leaner formulation of the obligation of cooperation under 
Article 3 could be envisaged. It would arguably be beneficial to its operation, and in turn help 
the EEAS to fulfil its coherence mandate. It would also defuse possible tensions between Article 
3 EEAS and other provisions of the Decision. 
                                                     
7 In the same vein, Article 13(1) EEAS Decision foresees that both the HR and the Council (as well as the 
Commission and the member states) are responsible for implementing the decision, it also says that they 
“shall take all measures necessary in furtherance thereof”. 
8 Regulation (EC) No. 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 may 1999 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European anti-fraud office (Olaf) [OJ 1999 L 136/1]. 
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Article 4 – Central administration of the EEAS 
 
• The title of the provision (“Central administration”) covers all parts of the EEAS bureaucracy. 
In several respects, the structure it establishes does not entirely correspond to the actual set up 
of the Service. Synchronisation and clarification are therefore desirable. 
• In general, the text of Article 4 could be synchronised with the organogram. In particular, the 
“directorates-general” mentioned in para 3 do not exist in practice, being Managing Directorates 
instead - one may indeed query the choice of having specific terminology for the bureaucratic 
organisation of the EEAS. The synchronisation would also concern the reference to SITCEN 
(now: INTCEN); the ostensible duplication of units of election observation (both in MD VI A.3 
and FPI); the absence in the organogram of a department for inter-institutional relations; and the 
fact that the division for administration, staffing, budgetary, security and communication and 
information system matters is in reality rightly managed by the Chief Operating Officer and not 
by Executive SG. Incidentally, “Public diplomacy” is now located with the FPI for budgetary 
reasons, but ought to be transferred to the central administration so that the linkages with the 
Political Affairs Department (notably DGS 2.2) and SG3 could be made more apparent. 
• More specifically, the senior management structure of the EEAS ought to be refined at several 
levels. Thus, the “corporate board”, which was introduced through an internal organisational 
decision, would merit a reference in the Decision if its existence is deemed necessary. Its role 
could then be defined at this level, or in new Rules of Procedure. Such Rules of Procedure 
should cover all relevant aspects of the EEAS’ working methods and its relations with other 
institutions. A reference to the adoption of the Rules of Procedure should indeed be included in 
the EEAS Decision. 
• The reference in para 1 to the obligation resting upon the Executive SG to ensure “effective 
coordination” could be spelled out, for instance in the above-mentioned Rules of Procedure. In 
the same vein, the responsibility for administrative and budgetary management, a role which, 
according to the EEAS Decision, falls to the Executive Secretary General, has per managerial 
decision been moved to the Chief Operating Officer. Paras 1 and 3(a) second indent should thus 
be brought in line with practice. Moreover, there needs to be a clearer demarcation between 
these portfolios and between those of the Chief Operating Officer and that of the “Managing 
Director for Administration and Finance”; a denomination that also merits synchronisation in an 
amendment of Article 4. Such clarifications would help to optimise decision-making. 
• Short-term recommendation No. 3 of the High Representative’s own Review from July 2013 
states that the coordinating responsibility for the Deputy Secretary General ought to be 
“confirm[ed]” for the CSDP and Security Policy and Crisis Prevention departments, including 
their relations with the rest of the EEAS. Arguably, a mere confirmation would not require an 
amendment of Article 4(3)a, third indent EEAS Decision, unless the current practice is contra 
legem. Any coordinating responsibility interfering with the “direct authority and responsibility 
of the High Representative” would, by contrast, require an amendment of the provision. 
• Mid-term recommendation No. 1 goes further and mentions an overhaul of management and 
procedures for CSDP operations (streamline planning functions for civilian and military 
missions; reduce intermediate steps in consultation of Council working groups; simplified 
procurement and financial procedures; integration of CSDP structures within the EEAS; 
reporting lines; mission support). Implementation of such proposals would probably require an 
amendment of Article 4 EEAS Decision and the flanking Financial Regulation (or recourse to 
Article 41(3) TEU), as well as a review of the “Crisis Management Procedures”. 
• The Commission’s Foreign Policy Instruments Service (FPI) is only referred to in Article 9(6) 
EEAS Decision as being co-located with the EEAS. A full integration of the FPI into the 
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structures of the EEAS is desirable and would require an adaptation of Article 4 so as to 
mention its role and function. 
• As discussed above, the Decision provides that the EEAS has the necessary legal capacity 
(Article 1), but makes no mention of who can act as its legal representative. Arguably, the HR is 
the legal representative of the EEAS. The EEAS Decision and/or the new Rules of Procedure 
should state this and delegate this task to the Executive SG (“under the authority of”).  
• Finally, the specific obligation of assistance in para 5 should be reformulated so as to stress its 
reciprocal character (see Art 2(2) EEAS Decision). 
EEAS 2.0 
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Article 5 – Union Delegations 
 
• Pursuant to para 1, a committee composed of Commission and Council staff discusses 
and decides, by consensus, whether to open or close EU Delegations. One may wonder whether 
it would, indeed, be helpful that new Rules of Procedure spell out what happens if no consensus 
is reached (e.g. alternative options) and whether consensus is also required upstream (i.e. in the 
college of Commissioners and the Council).  
• If the text of para 1 were to be adapted, then mention could be made of different types of 
representations (e.g. liaison offices), possibly distinguishing them in the (inter-institutional) 
approval procedure.  
• Practice has revealed that there is a need to clarify the status of EU diplomats and the potential 
extension of EU diplomatic passports to them, also in order to prevent members of diplomatic 
missions from being assessed by third countries on the basis of their nationality. Article 5 would 
be the locus classicus for such textual additions. 
• Given that European Union Special Representatives (EUSRs) cooperate closely with the EEAS, 
it is advisable to integrate them and their staff in the Service’s structures. Short-term 
recommendation No. 4 of the High Representative’s own report also states that the mandates 
and role of EUSRs should be reviewed, in order to integrate them more closely into EEAS 
structures (HQ and delegations). Full integration of EUSRs as such into the EEAS would 
require an amendment of the TEU (at the level of Articles 27 and 33) and the EEAS Decision (it 
was deliberately not included in 2010). To that end, a reference could best be introduced in 
Article 6 EEAS Decision. The duty of EU Delegations to support, communicate and consult 
with EUSRs should be introduced in Article 5. The double-hatting of EUSRs with EU Heads of 
Delegation deserves to be re-thought and, perhaps under certain conditions, mentioned. Changes 
in EUSR mandates and an increase in the EEAS budget and staff would require amendments of 
Council decisions on specific EUSR mandates. 
• In order to ensure that staff profiles and the size of EU Delegations reflect the  strategic interests 
and political priorities of the EU, the EEAS could be granted a greater say in the (re)allocation 
of Commission staff in EU Delegations and the appointment of staff with specific tasks (e.g. 
human rights focal points, CSDP attachés). In this context, the authority of the Heads of 
Delegation over the whole staff (including Commission staff) should be strengthened, whilst 
ensuring that the Head of Delegation is the addressee of all instructions issued by 
Headquarters.9 In Delegations where the number of EEAS staff is small, the Head of Delegation 
should, in keeping with para 2, be able to task Commission staff to carry out political analysis 
and political reporting. 
• In terms of evaluation, the Delegations are covered by the same rules as other EU bodies (para 
5). A similar provision is not included for the EEAS as such, although Article 3(4) does refer to 
specific inspections by OLAF. If the Decision were to be revised, then it is worth including a 
similar provision for EEAS itself. 
• The practical implementation of para 8 has given rise to many questions which ought to be 
addressed both at the level of the EEAS Decision and in new Rules of Procedure: Why not 
include a mention of the representation of the EU to international organisations? Could a Head 
of Delegation initial international agreements on behalf of the EU? What exactly is the judicial 
                                                     
9 Short-term recommendation No. 14 of the High Representative states that all instructions to Delegations would 
be required to pass by the Heads of Delegation and copied to the relevant EEAS geographical desk. This falls 
within the application of Article 5(3) EEAS Decision, as spelled out in the inter-service agreement between 
the EEAS and the Commission. 
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power of a Head of Delegation? Can a Head of Delegation sue on behalf of the Union? If so, 
under which jurisdictions? In this context it is worth noting that the Head of Delegation has the 
power to represent the Union, and therefore also the Commission pursuant to Article 17 TEU, 
but that there are limits, as the ELTI case has shown. 
• The specific obligation of assistance in para 9 should be reformulated so as to stress its 
reciprocal character (see Art 2(2) EEAS Decision). 
• Finally, short-term recommendation No. 19 of the High Representative’s Review mentions, 
inter alia, that the debate on a possible consular role of EU Delegations ought to be pursued. If 
political agreement were reached and additional resources and expertise from member states 
allocated, then Article 5(10) EEAS Decision might require amendment, within the limits set out 
in Articles 35 TEU and 23 TFEU. 
EEAS 2.0 
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Article 6 – Staff  
 
• Article 13(3) EEAS Decision pays particular attention to the review of paras 6, 8 and 11 of 
Article 6. Paras 6 and 8 suffer from some duplication and could in fact be merged into a more 
succinct text. Rather than relying heavily on the High Representative’s involvement in the final 
stages of recruitment of staff above director level, the amended text should mention the EEAS’s 
Consultative Committee on Appointments (CCA) more explicitly. As the text stands now, the 
CCA is referred to only implicitly in the last sentence of para 8. Although the CCA was created 
with selection interviews of senior managers and heads of delegation in mind, it has a more 
general mandate regarding staffing at other levels, including monitoring selection procedures 
and developing staffing. A reinforced CCA could be charged with developing currently vague 
concepts such as the meaning of ‘merit’, ‘adequate’ geographical and gender balance, and a 
‘meaningful’ presence of nationals from all of the member states.  
• The Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (CEOS), in Article 50b(2), suggest that staff 
can be engaged for a “maximum period of four years,” but that contracts may be “renewed for a 
maximum period of four years.” Provision is made for renewal for a further two years under 
“exceptional circumstances.” One may wonder whether this implies that staff shall have to 
(re)apply for a vacant position, even if they are the incumbent, upon the completion of a four-
year term. The EEAS Decision is ambiguous on this point and the text of para 11 ought to be 
aligned with the CEOS. 
• Paras 2 and 3 are in effect the successor paragraphs to Article 7, which has become obsolete. 
Para 2 might usefully introduce EU Special Representatives, which are currently not mentioned 
in the text of the Decision (other than the annex where only staff on secondment to EUSRs are 
mentioned). Since the Special Representatives are appointed by a Council CFSP decision and 
support the work of the High Representative – in many ways representing the ‘face’ of the EU 
and its policies in various countries or regions – their non-inclusion as part of the EEAS is 
anomalous. Importantly, the EUSRs provide an essential link between the CFSP and the 
Commission’s external actions (Recitals 2-3). All decisions appointing EUSRs have more or 
less standard provisions (see Art 12 on Coordination) which could provide the relevant wording 
for a revised EEAS Decision. There would also need to be reference to Article 5 regarding the 
relationship between EUSRs and Delegations.  
• The reference in the latter part of para 3 to rules applicable to national experts and military staff 
on secondment was adopted on 23 March 2011(2012/C 12/04). A question arises as to whether 
the reference should thus be removed or instead be maintained to allow the HR to adjust the 
adopted rules if necessary.  
• Short-term recommendation No. 24 of the High Representative’s Review states the need for a 
specific policy on status and management of temporary agents from member states to cover 
contract duration/renewal, access to mobility and rotation policies for EEAS posts, grading and 
promotion. Depending on the scope this may require amendment of Article 6 EEAS Decision 
and/or the Staff Regulation. 
• Similarly, the question can be raised whether the reference in para 9 to the end of the 
transitional period merits deletion. The paragraph states “when the EEAS has reached its full 
capacity,” implying that such a ratio must be achieved by mid-2013, i.e. the time of the High 
Representative’s review pursuant to Article 13(3). At the end of para 9 the High Representative 
is required to prepare a report “each year,” implying that these arrangements go beyond the 
transitional period. The logic of the paragraph and its sustainability is important since it appears 
to establish a principle, and it is also linked to para 6. The latter part of para 9 would therefore 
benefit from clarification. 
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• Finally, para 12 packs some highly subjective terminology: What is “adequate” training? What 
are “appropriate measures”? The Committee on budgetary control report for discharge to the 
EEAS of 2011 budget says that quite a lot of staff lack the correct skills (notably in EU 
Delegations). The last part of the para 12 mentions steps to be taken “within the year following 
the entry into force of this Decision.” Arguably, the text needs updating with new longer-term 
goals, perhaps aiming for more than adequacy. A revised paragraph might appropriately address 
what ‘appropriate steps’ might be taken beyond the transition period.  
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Article 7 – Transitional provisions regarding staff 
 
Obsolete. Can be removed. 
 
Article 8 – Budget  
 
• Article 8 bears no direct reference to the status of the EEAS as an ‘institution’ for 
budgetary purposes. Instead, paras 1, 2 and 6 refer to the “Financial Regulation”, currently 
Regulation No 1081/2010, in which this specific institutional status has been attributed. Para 2 
is the one and only place in the EEAS Decision that speaks of the “powers” of the EEAS, in this 
context to be understood as those “tasks” attributed to the Service qua institution under the 
Financial Regulation. Arguably, the budgetary tasks under Article 8 do not increase the position 
of the EEAS, but rather the powers of the European Parliament to exert budgetary control over 
the EEAS. The lack of direct reference to the EEAS’ specific institutional status and the 
inclusion of the word “powers” instead of “tasks” creates confusion with the language employed 
in the rest of the EEAS Decision and would merit clarification. 
• Para 1: Arguably, Article 8 should not open with this specific provision, but rather with the 
issues discussed under the previous indent and partly covered in the current text of para 2. The 
first two paragraphs of Article 8 should then swap positions. 
• The text of para 1 exposes a rift between administrative and operational expenditures, even if in 
practice the dividing line between the two is not always clear. In practice, this split in financial 
circuits between the EEAS and the Commission has caused some difficulties, especially in EU 
Delegations where there is only one EEAS staff member and in places where disbursement of 
aid constitutes the main portion of the Delegation’s activities. The split effectively means that 
Heads of Delegation cannot sub-delegate the sub-delegated powers from the Commission to 
‘non-Commission’, i.e. EEAS staff (e.g. on FPI, human rights instruments, etc.). This raises 
questions about the rapidity of funding disbursement and the attention a Head of Delegation can 
give to political issues. The difficulties in bridging the divide in financial circuits are apparent 
from the time it took to work out how to operate the system: 13 months to agree on “Working 
Arrangements” between the Commission and the EEAS. There is a widely felt need to 
streamline the current system, which would not necessarily impact on the current language of 
para 1, but rather on the text of the Working Arrangements. Arguably, such amendments should 
also relate to the differences in procedural arrangements between each of the external action 
programmes (see Art 9 EEAS Decision). 
• Short-term recommendation No. 17 of the High Representative’s Review states that the 
administrative budget of Delegations ought to be simplified in order to ensure a single source of 
funding (by combining money from the EEAS and Commission budgets). Implementing this 
recommendation would possibly require changes to the Financial Regulation and/or Article 8 
EEAS Decision. 
• Para 2: As mentioned above, Article 8 should rather open with this paragraph and include an 
explicit reference to the specificity of the institutional status of the EEAS. The language in this 
paragraph should be harmonised so as to ensure more consistency with other provisions of the 
EEAS Decision (notably Art 2 on ‘tasks’), and between different language versions (e.g. 
FR/UK). 
• Para 3: A possible amendment of the EEAS Decision could offer the opportunity to add the 
Commissioner responsible for humanitarian assistance and crisis response to those already 
mentioned in the text. Conversely, and more appropriately, para 3 could be formulated in a 
more open-ended fashion by simply referring to all Commissioners with an external dimension 
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to their portfolio, insofar as it regards their respective responsibilities in drawing up estimates of 
administrative expenditure for the EEAS. 
• Para 4: There is no need to editorialise this paragraph. 
• Para 5: The phrase “budgetary authority” is EU jargon to indicate the powers held by both the 
European Parliament and the Council. For the sake of transparency, the text could refer to these 
institutions specifically. 
• Para 6: There is no need to editorialise this paragraph, except if the numbering of the Financial 
Regulation that flanks the EEAS Decision were to be amended. 
• If the roles of the Commission’s Accountant and Internal Audit Service is to be reviewed in 
relation to the financial management of EEAS, as mid-term recommendation No. 8 of the High 
Representative’s own Review suggests, then this may require amendment of Article 8 EEAS 
Decision and/or the Financial Regulation. 
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Article 9 – External action instruments and programming 
 
• According to para 1, the overall ‘management’ of the Union’s external cooperation programmes 
remains ‘under’ the responsibility of the Commission “without prejudice to the respective roles 
of the Commission and of the EEAS in programming”. Thus, pursuant to Article 17(1) 4th 
sentence TEU, the Commission retains overall responsibility for dealing with and controlling 
the Union’s external cooperation programmes, whereas it shares the role of ‘programming’, i.e. 
designing, scheduling, or planning such programmes. Yet, Article 9(2) EEAS Decision imposes 
an obligation (“shall”) on the High Representative to “ensure the overall political coordination 
(…), the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action”. Arguably, the 
obligation of ensuring “overall political coordination” by the HR – not the VP – is 
superimposed on the Commission’s responsibility for the management of the EU’s external 
assistance programmes. For that reason, it would make more sense to turn the positions of paras 
1 and 2 around. 
• In theory, the HR/VP is in an ideal position to match the modus operandi of EU assistance and 
cooperation programmes with political priorities. In practice, however, this requires the HR to 
make full use of his powers as VP (see the discussion on deputisation under Art 2 EEAS 
Decision). 
• Mid-term recommendation No. 4 of the High Representative’s own Review mentions that in the 
future allocation of Commission portfolios,10 the HR/VP’s position in Commission decision-
making on external assistance programmes should be strengthened to ensure optimal coherence 
with EU foreign policy priorities. Whereas the former would require a decision by the future 
President of the Commission under Article 17(6) TEU (internal organisation and guidelines for 
Commission work), the latter could lead to an amendment of Article 9 EEAS Decision. 
• Paras 3-6 endow the EEAS with the responsibility for strategic programming and planning, and 
the Commission with the implementation of external action instruments. In practice, this 
managerial split has hampered the operationalisation of aid and cooperation programmes. For 
example, the fact that the EEAS takes the lead in programming, except when it concerns 
thematic programmes (e.g. EIDHR and NSCI), seems a good candidate for streamlining. The 
detailed Working Arrangements agreed to by the Commission and the EEAS in January 2012 
paper over most of the cracks, but do not in and by themselves assure that the differences in 
expertise and procedural requirements between each of the external action programmes are 
overcome.11 For instance, the EEAS is supposed to do country allocations, but this has been 
slow to materialise. Similarly, one may wonder whether it makes sense to maintain the 
procedural split in the operationalisation of the Instrument for Stability (cf. paras 2 and 6). 
• Some terminological changes will need to be made to paras 2-6 to bring the text in line with the 
new terminology employed under the next Multi-annual Financial Framework (e.g. the 
“European Neighbourhood Instrument” and the “Partnership Instrument for cooperation with 
third countries”). 
• Para 2: Humanitarian assistance, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) and 
financial assistance to non-European Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) are not covered 
                                                     
10 A sub-recommendation thereto is to clarify the HR/VP’s lead responsibility for relations with Western Balkans 
and ENP countries. 
11 Short-term recommendation No. 13 of the High Representative’s review states that the EEAS ought to 
maintain active influence on the programming of EU external assistance, within the existing legal 
framework. Arguably though, this need not lead to an amendment of the Council Decision as the issue 
already falls within the remit of the inter-service agreement between the EEAS and the Commission in 
application of Article 9 of the Decision. 
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by Article 9 EEAS Decision. Planning and programming of these instruments are unified and 
continue to be managed by the Commission, under the responsibility of DG ECHO, DG 
ELARG, and DG DEVCO respectively. Nevertheless, DG ECHO and DG ELARG consult the 
EEAS on strategic priorities when preparing the Multiannual Financial Framework for the IPA 
and on IPA programming, through the inter-service consultation process. Arguably, coherence 
in this context would be helped if political oversight for these instruments would also be 
brought under the responsibility of the High Representative – and strategic programming and 
planning under the EEAS. 
• Para 3: In fulfilling their duty of cooperation vis-à-vis the relevant members and services of the 
Commission, the High Representative and the EEAS are obliged to follow the former 
institution’s procedures. In compliance with para 3, one should nevertheless ensure that the 
EEAS plays a leading role in the definition of the strategies of the relevant external financial 
assistance instruments and that, for this purpose, the EEAS has the relevant expertise to lead in 
these areas. 
• Para 4: Because the ENPI is covered by para 5, and because para 6 covers actions undertaken 
under the CFSP budget, the part of the IfS other than that referred to in para 2, the ICI, press, 
communication and public diplomacy actions, and EIDHR election observation missions 
(EOM), one can reason a contrario that the provision in the second sentence of para 4 only 
applies to the preparation of thematic programmes under the EDF and DCI. Arguably, this is a 
rather cumbersome way of legal drafting and could be sharpened up. 
• Para 6: The Foreign Policy Instruments DG of the Commission is co-located with, but not fully 
integrated into the EEAS. In view of the points raised at the outset, as indeed calls from member 
states in several non-papers to give the EEAS a tighter grasp of operational expenditures, it 
makes sense to change the formulation of the final sentence of para 6 in this respect. 
• Elements that could be introduced in a separate paragraph of Article 9 EEAS Decision concern 
the evaluation of external assistance and financial responsibility. The inter-service Working 
Arrangements could hereby be given more legal bite, and the administrative structures which 
deal with evaluation and monitoring (e.g. the Group of External Relations Commissioners, the 
EEAS and Commission services) more clout. 
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Article 10 – Security  
• Para 1 is now outdated and needs to be refreshed in view of an amended Council Decision 
2001/264/EC. Para 1 should reflect the adoption of the 2011 EEAS security rules12 and the 2011 
Council security rules.13 This includes ending, or at least identifying the continuous role of the 
Council Security Committee after the adoption of EEAS security rules and the establishment of 
an EEAS Security Committee (Art 9(6) EEAS security rules), which consists inter alia of 
representatives of the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission. It could further 
benefit from clarifying the term “all appropriate measures”. In this context, one may wonder 
whether the HR has any specific duties beyond adopting the appropriate legal instruments. 
Similarly, the term “duty of care” of the EEAS could be clarified, e.g. by referring to a standard 
equivalent to the 2011 Council security rules. 
• Para 2 needs to be amended in light of para 1. The first indent should refer to the 2011 Council 
security rules and the second indent should be deleted. 
• Para 3 can remain unchanged. The relationship between the department responsible for security 
matters and the EEAS Security Committee could, however, be clarified. 
• Para 4 foresees that the HR/VP shall take “any measure necessary” in order to implement 
security rules in the EEAS, but remains unclear as to the scope of such measure. 
Implementation has not yet taken place. The EEAS shall seek advice from the GSC Security 
Office, relevant European Commission services and relevant services of the member states. 
Whether or not this duty of consultation should be reciprocal is perhaps a matter for discussion. 
In practice, the Commission takes a rather subservient role, and the process is very much 
Council-driven, through its security committee. Rather than simply taking over the rules of the 
Council and the Commission specific responsibility for this should fall to the EEAS, in line with 
its tasks. Considering that the Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the principles of democracy and 
transparency, all rule-making processes should be transparent and visible. 
• Is the EEAS not obliged (like the Council) to publish an annual report on (figures of) 
classified documents and on unclassified but non-public documents? The Declaration on Political 
Accountability of the HR towards the EP would no doubt require this (certainly for documents in areas 
on which the EP has consent). For the moment there is no structured approach to the classification of 
EEAS documents. What should be made clear is what rules the EEAS is applying, on what grounds 
and for what types of documents it considers (different categories) of classification as necessary. In 
short, para 4 should, besides emphasising the protection of classified information, contain a reference 
to the principle of transparency and identify an EEAS obligation to publish an annual report on 
classification practices and figures. In addition, this will explicitly require the originators of classified 
information within the EEAS to balance, at the moment classification is being considered, the public 
interest in openness. 
                                                     
12 Decision 2011/C 304/05 of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 
June 2011 on the security rules for the European External Action Service, OJ 2011 C 304/7 (hereinafter: 
EEAS security rules). 
13 Annex to Council Decision 2011/292/EU of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified 
information, OJ 2011 L 141/17. 
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• Article 11 – Access to documents, archives and protection 
• Para 1: Regulation 1049/2001 on access to documents applies to the EEAS, which should be 
regarded as an institution in that respect, and should submit its own report pursuant to Article 
17(1). On 19 July 2011, the High Representative adopted Decision 2011/C 243/08 on the rules 
regarding access to documents.14 For clarification, Regulation 1049/2001 ought to be amended 
to reflect that (cf. COM(2011) 137 final). The last sentence of para 1 appears to give a broad 
implementing power to the HR rather than a one-off implementing task. The sentence could 
thus be maintained despite the adoption of the decision.  
• The mandatory exceptions to access to documents in Article 4(1) Regulation 1049/2001, which 
are likely to be of particular relevance to the EEAS, are broadly formulated. As yet, however, 
there is no ECJ case law on how the EEAS should apply this rule. Nevertheless, the case law of 
the Court of Justice and the General Court with respect to access to documents regarding EU 
institutions in general and the application of the exception in Article 4(1)(a) in particular are 
likely to be relevant. The EEAS needs to take due account of the recent evolutions in this case 
law and develop an appropriate policy in accordance therewith.15  
• Para 2: No need to editorialise. 
• Para 3: On 8 December 2011, the High Representative adopted a decision on the rules regarding 
data protection,16 which lays down the implementing rules concerning Regulation (EC) 45/2001 
as regards the EEAS. As in the case of para 1, the last sentence of para 3 seemingly confers a 
broad implementing power to the HR, which could therefore be maintained.  
 
Article 12 – Immovable property 
Obsolete. Can be removed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 Decision 2011/C 243/08 of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 
July 2011 on the rules regarding access to documents [2011] OJ C243/16. 
15 Indeed, the In 't Veld cases (see also T-301/10 In 't Veld v Commission) raise the issue of whether the regime 
of access to EEAS documents for MEPs ought to be reviewed (see recital 6 EEAS Decision; point 4 of 
Declaration of Political Accountability HR), in particular in light of Article 218(10) TFEU, which provides 
for the EP to be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for negotiating international 
agreements. Inter alia, the HR should transmit the draft negotiating directives to the EP, in the same way the 
Commission transmits such documents to the EP. 
16 Decision 2012/C 308/07 of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 8 
December 2011 on the rules regarding data protection [2012] OJ C308/8. 
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Article 13 – Final and General Provisions 
• Para 1: Given the role played by the European Parliament, notably as budgetary authority, 
should the EP also be made responsible for the implementation of the Decision, and bound to 
take the measures necessary in furtherance thereof? 
• Para 2: Obsolete. Can be removed. 
• Para 3: various parts of the provisions are obsolete and can be removed, most notably the 
references to the timing of the review. The duty to undertake an assessment of the operation of 
the revised Decision could nevertheless be envisaged, along the lines of what is foreseen in this 
paragraph, with a timing to be determined.  
• Para 3 foresees that the revised decision would have to be adopted on the basis of Article 27(3) 
TEU. In view of the content of the current EEAS Decision, the question arises whether an 
additional legal basis ought to be considered when adopting a new decision. Such additional 
legal basis would make it clear that the scope of EEAS activities is broader than the CFSP, in 
that the EEAS also supports the HR/VP as VP in Commission territory. Among the possible 
additional legal bases, some are non-controversial, such as Article 21(3) TEU (already 
mentioned in the preamble of the Decision) which sets out the coherence task of the HR/VP, 
which the EEAS is deemed to assist. Other legal bases might be more controversial, such as 
Article 17(1) TEU, which relates to the Commission’s power of external representation. Should 
the EEAS Decision become more specific, e.g. on programming, other substantive legal bases, 
such as Article 209 TFEU on development cooperation, could in principle be envisioned too. 
The nature of the Decision, and the process to adopt it would however be altered by such a 
substantive legal basis located in the TFEU, and may raise issues of compatibility with the 
provisions of Article 27(3) TEU. Indeed, the European Court of Justice has restricted the 
possible combination of TEU and TFEU legal bases.17  
• A modification of the legal basis of the Decision could thus be contemplated should the 
Decision be revised. An additional legal basis would allow more room to make the decision 
more specific, and would ensure its compliance with Article 40 TEU. Additional legal bases 
would nevertheless have to be compatible with the procedure of Article 27(3) TEU. It would 
appear that adding a legal basis such as Article 21(3) TEU (and/or Art 205 TFEU) would meet 
the above considerations.  
• Para 4: the entire paragraph, save its first sentence, is obsolete and can be removed.  
• Para 5: Obsolete. Can be removed. 
• Para 6: can stay as it is; it could also be combined with the revised provision of para 4. 
ANNEX - Departments and functions to be transferred to the EEAS 
Obsolete. Can be removed. 
                                                     
17 See judgment in C-130/10 Parliament v Council, n.y.r. 
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